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Abstract: 
A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are 
important. Often a decision’s importance is related to the magnitude of the associated monetary 
stake.  Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can 
be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices (since subjects have no incentive to 
answer questions falsely.)  However, results reported by Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL), 
as well as replications by Harrison (2005) suggest that decisions in “high” monetary payoff 
environments are not well-predicted by questionnaire responses. Thus, a potential implication of 
the HL results is that studying decisions in high stakes environments requires using high stakes. 
Here we describe and implement a procedure for studying high-stakes behavior in a low-stakes 
environment. We use the binary-lottery reward technique (introduced by Berg, et al (1986)) to 
induce preferences in a way that is consistent with the decisions reported by HL under a variety 
of stake sizes. The resulting decisions, all of which were made in a low-stakes environment, 
reflect surprisingly well the noisy choice behavior reported by HL’s subjects even in their high-
stakes environment. This finding is important because inducing preferences evidently requires 
substantially less cost than paying people to participate in extremely high-stakes games.  
 
1 Introduction 
How should subjects be paid? Experimental economics emphasizes the importance of paying 
subjects with real dollars, although often small in magnitude (of course theory assumes 
consumption derives from real dollars.)  Thus, when numerous challenges to the classical theory 
of decision-making (Expected Utility Theory) were generated based on hypothetical decisions 
(See e.g. Khaneman and Tversky, 1979), the results were, and to some extent still are, a matter of 
debate. 
Khaneman and Tversky (1979) defend hypothetical choices arguing that there is no 
reason for subjects not to tell the truth.  Camerer and Hogarth (1999) argue that choices may 
involve differential productive effort, which can affect what the experimenter observes.  Such 
observations, whether from hypothetical choices or choices for dollars, may be distortions from a 
subject’s true preferences. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) also assert that no experiments paying 
subjects based on dollars have overturned anomalies observed from hypothetical choices.  
An alternative position has its most outspoken advocate in Harrison.  In a sequence of 
experiments, Harrison (1994) has argued that changing incentives critically alters outcomes of 
the anomalies literature, including the Allais Paradox and the Preference Reversal Phenomena. 
His criticism, while predominately directed at anomalies based on hypothetical choices, also 
generates concerns for experiments using small cash payments.    
Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) focus on a sequence of paired comparisons, which are not 
subject to any known anomalies.   Their study contrasts the choices made when decisions are 
hypothetical versus when the decisions lead to real dollar payments.    The conclusions regarding 
the dollar payments are subject to an order effect which Harrison et. al. (2005) controls for and 
finds that the qualitative results of HL remain (although the estimated form of the preference 
function changes.)  
An abbreviated version of the HL design is the following: Subjects in each treatment 
made ten decisions between two gambles (illustrated in Table 1a.) One gamble was a “safe” 
gamble with a small payout difference between the two possible payouts, while the other was 
“riskier” with a higher difference between payoffs.  As seen in the table, the seven treatments run 
included four degrees of increasing actual stake sizes and three corresponding hypothetical high 
stakes treatments where subjects’ instructions asked what they would do in the event they faced 
the decisions in an actual high stake environment.  Subjects received payment based on one 
randomly selected draw from their ten decisions. 
<Table 1> 
 The HL results argue that, for a low level of payoffs, there was no distinction between the 
between hypothetical and real payoffs; however, as stakes increased by factors of 20, 50, and 90 
there was a marked divergence between the results with payoffs and the results without payoffs. 
Figures 1 and 2 portray these results. Note that hypothetical payoffs shift the distributions right. 
While providing support for the validity of paying subjects in cash, HL’s results cast 
further doubt on the effectiveness of using small stakes experiments to arrive at insights about 
how subjects behave in a high stakes environment. To our knowledge the HL experiments are the 
only risk-elicitation games that use such high dollar stakes1. As everyday portfolio and 
production decisions can easily be of such magnitudes, the generalization from low stakes 
behavioral experiments appears tenuous.  
                                                            
1 A number of of high-stakes experiments have been studied. For example, Rapoport (2003) reports a high-stakes 
centipede game and Camerer (2003) reviews various high-stakes ultimatum games. 
We here take an important first step towards solving this problem. In particular, we show 
that one can use low stakes experiments to produce choices that approximate decisions for much 
higher stakes.  We demonstrate that the induction of preferences method (from Malouf and Roth, 
1979 and Berg et. al., 1986) can be extended effectively to induce high stakes preferences in 
environments with low stakes real payments.  The method takes an existing preference function 
(we use the utility function estimates reported by HL) that summarizes choices in a high stakes 
environment, and then generates low stakes gambles which produce choices consistent with the 
original preference function (for theory and proofs that formally justify this approach see Berg 
et. al., 1986). 
We induce the preference function inferred by HL, and then compare the choices made 
with the induced high stakes preference function both to the hypothetical choices of HL 
(showing the choice distributions are different) and to the real dollar payoff choices of HL 
(finding the choice decisions indistinguishable.) 
 
2 Background in Inducing 
The technique (Malouf and Roth, (1979); Berg et. al. (1986)) is used in choice settings as 
well as in examining the predictive ability of equilibrium concepts in multiple person settings.  
The complete story of its validity and potential uses has still not been determined, so that the 
current study adds to understanding of the technique.  Several reviews of the technique exist 
suggesting that risk aversion can be induced relatively successfully but that there are mixed 
results for risk preferring and risk neutrality (for other reviews see also Davis and Holt, (1993) 
Roth (1995), Camerer (2003)).   
Comment [JAA1]: Should we cite a few of these 
studies you (john) refer to here? 
Two sets of studies have focused on examining anomalies: those by Harrison (1994) and 
those by Selton et. al (1999).  Harrison generally finds that induction mitigates anomalies, while 
Selton et al. (1999) argues that with induction the results are no different than paying people in 
cash (including preference reversal, Allais paradox effects, etc.).  Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz 
(2003) reexamine the Selton et al. (1999) finding, using inducing, and show that unlike Selton et. 
al (1999), inducing does not refute an expected utility with noise explanation and in fact 
significantly alters the preference reversal claims of Selton et. al. (1999).     
 
3 Experimental Design 
Our goal is to create an experiment that can incentivize high-stakes behavior in a low-stakes 
environment. To do this we incorporate the inducing procedure of Berg et al. (1986) into the HL 
experimental design.  We study five treatments.  The first four coincide with the four treatments 
in HL: Low payouts, 20x payouts, 50x payouts, and 90x payouts.   Often times we would like to 
examine decisions people make under very high sums, thus we expand the manipulation beyond 
incentives used by HL. The fifth treatment we run does not occur in HL, but is a treatment 
comparable to offering 180x the payouts of the HL Low payout treatment.  Appendix A contains 
a transcript of the instructions. 
 
3.1 Stage 1 
In Stage 1, subjects make a decision between two lotteries, A and B.  This is the only decision 
the subject makes.  Instead of being paid cash from the outcomes of their chosen lottery, as in 
HL, subjects receive points.  Table 2 lays out each of these ten decisions.  As shown, in the first 
decision, there is a 10% (90%) chance of the high (low) number of points.  As subjects proceed 
through the decisions, the chance increases (decreases) by 10% each decision.  After a subject 
makes their decision (A or B), they roll a ten-sided die, which determines the number of points 
they receive.  A roll of 1 in the first decision means the subject receives the high number of 
points, a 1 or 2 in the second decision means they receive the high number of points, a 1, 2, or 3 
in the third, and so on.       
<Table 2> 
 
Table 3 lays out the points that make up the high and low payouts of each lottery (A and 
B) in the five treatments.  The table indicates that the points earned in each of our treatments 
coincide precisely with the dollars earned in the corresponding HL treatment (third and seventh 
columns.)  For example if a subject would earn 40 dollars in the HL treatment, they would earn 
40 points in our treatment.  
<Table 3> 
3.2 Stage 2 
Stage 2 converts the points subjects earn in Stage 1 into monetary cash earnings.  Subjects either 
earn $2.50 for the decision or nothing.  The points a subject receives in Stage 1 translate into 
chances (Bernoulli trial probabilities) to win a $2.50 prize (more points implies more probability 
of the prize.) Table 3 shows the probability that a subject wins the prize for each of the possible 
number of points earned in each treatment (fourth and eighth columns.)  Subjects roll a 100-sided 
die on their desk to determine if they win the prize.  For example, when a subject has a 2% 
chance of the prize, if the die lands with sides 1 or 2 facing up, they win the prize, otherwise they 
do not.  Likewise, if a subject has a 73% chance of the prize, with any side between (and 
including) 1 and 73 facing up, they win the prize. 
 3.3 Discussion 
It is worth emphasizing several features of our design. First, the only difference between the 
treatments come in the point payouts (and the related prize probabilities.) Secondly, note that 
while the probability of winning the prize changes between treatments, the value of the prize 
does not.  The prize remains at a constant $2.50 in each of the treatments.  Thus, while in HL 
treatments the amount a subject can win increases dramatically through the treatments, in our 
treatments a subject never receives the opportunity to earn more than $2.50 for a decision 
(subjects always participates in a low-stakes experiment.)  Finally, with the use of the Berg et al. 
(1986) methodology, there are no wealth effects in our design. 2  We can therefore pay subjects 
for each of the ten HL decisions instead of only one randomly selected decision.  
 
3.4 Procedures 
Upon arriving to the experiment, the experimenter directs subjects to the appropriate room where 
they read the instructions in private and listen to the instructions read aloud by the experimenter.  
The instructions include paid practice to insure subjects understand the procedures.  After the 
instructions, subjects make their first decision between lotteries A and B.  Subjects then roll a 
ten-sided die at their desk (with the monitor watching) to determine the number of points they 
receive, which is recorded.  The subject follows that roll, immediately, with the roll of a 100-
sided die to determine if they win the $2.50 prize.  Each of the ten HL decisions repeats this 
procedure.  Subjects receive their cash payments immediately prior to leaving the laboratory.   
 
                                                            
2 Wealth effects are not a problem in this design because we pay subjects in points for their Stage 1 decision.  
Assuming expected utility maximization, subjects should prefer to choose the point-maximizing option, and this is 
independent of wealth levels.  
3.5 Hypotheses 
HL’s hypothetical treatments provide data on how subjects make stage 1 decisions in the above 
design, when faced with hypothetical large payments.  In order to demonstrate that high-stakes 
behavior can be induced in a low-stakes environment, subjects must not approach the induced 
high-stakes of our design environment as a hypothetical high-stakes environment.   
 
Hypotheses 1   The distribution of safe choices (choice A) from our choice data based on 
induced preferences will be statistically distinguishable from the Holt-Laury distribution of safe 
choices for each hypothetical high stakes treatment. 
Likewise, successfully inducing high stakes subject decision-making behavior requires 
subjects’ decisions in the induced high stakes environment not to significantly differ from 
subject behavior under actual high stakes.  Hypothesis 2 captures this requirement, using the HL 
data from their actual stakes treatments as a comparison group.  
Hypotheses 2 The distribution of safe choices (choice A) from our choice data based on induced 
preferences will be statistically indistinguishable from the Holt-Laury distribution of safe 
choices for each real stakes treatment.  
 
5 Results 
The experiments took place at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) at 
George Mason University.  Subjects were randomly recruited from the George Mason student 
body. In addition to any amount earned in the experiment, each subject received seven dollars for 
arriving to the laboratory on time.  Subjects spent about 90 minutes in the laboratory.   
We report data from 98 subjects in five treatments: 19 in the Low treatment, 20 in the x20 
treatment, 17 in the x50, 21 in the x90, and 21 in the x180.3  We compare the decisions made by 
these subjects in our induced stakes environments to the decisions made by the subjects in the 
comparable experimental treatments in HL. 
 
Result 1: The distribution of safe choices (choice A) from our choice data based on 
induced preferences is statistically different from the Holt-Laury distribution of safe choices for 
each of the three HL hypothetical high stakes treatments. 
This result supports Hypothesis 1. The three graphs in Figure 1 show that subjects 
systematically approach induced preference environments differently than they approach 
hypothetical high stakes environments.  The reported p-values from the Kolmogrov-Smirnov and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests show significant differences at standard levels for all three treatments. For 
the Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests: p=0.046, p =0 .087, and p=0.016 for the x20, x50, and x90 
treatments respectively. For the Kruskal-Wallis: p=0.032, p=0.006, p=0.006 for the x20, x50 and 
x90 treatments respectively.  
 
Result 2: The distribution of safe choices (choice A) from our choice data based on 
induced preferences is statistically indistinguishable from the Holt-Laury distribution of safe 
choices for each of the four HL treatments. 
This result supports Hypothesis 2. As the four graphs in Figure 2 show, the distribution of 
safe choices chosen by subjects in each of our induced preference treatments follows that of the 
distribution of safe choices chosen by subjects in HL.  There is no significant difference between 
                                                            
3 These samples are similar to the sample sizes used by HL in their very high stakes treatments (19 and 18 in their 
x50 and x90 treatments respectively.)  
these two distributions in any of the four treatments, at standard levels, neither through use of 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov 2-tailed tests nor Kruskal-Wallis two-tailed tests.  
 
<Figure 2> 
Result 3: The actual distribution of safe choices with induced preferences of simulated 
high stakes that are 180 times that of Holt-Laury’s low stakes follows the distribution of safe 
choices predicted by the Holt-Laury power-expo utility function. 
This result supports Hypothesis 3.  Figure 3 shows the predicted noisy distribution using 
HL’s power-expo function under an actual 180x stakes environment compared to subjects in our 
experiment under an induced 180x stakes environment.  A chi-squared goodness-of-fit test 
shows no significant difference between these two distributions (P>0.25).   
 
<Figure 3> 
Result 4: The use of induced high stakes environments in experiments is cheaper than the 
use of actual high stakes environments. 
Table 4 displays result 4 in greater detail.  The first column of the table lists the expected 
costs of paying one subject for one randomly selected lottery from their ten lottery choices made 
in a standard actual-stakes HL session.  The second column shows the comparable cost when 
using an induced high stakes environment instead.  As seen, the expected cost differences are 
substantial.  As discussed briefly in the design section, in the induced stakes environment, 
experimenters can pay subjects for all ten lottery decisions without wealth effects concerns. The 
fourth column in the table lays out the expected cost per subject when paying for each decision.  
Comparison to the third column demonstrates that even if one could pay for all ten decisions 
under actual high stakes without wealth effects, the cost per subject increases rapidly.  As a 
comparison, our induced stakes environment has an expected cost per observation of about 22 
dollars in the 180x stakes treatment when paying for all ten decisions, while paying for one 
decision in an actual 180x stakes environment has an expected cost of over 388 dollars per 
observation.  
<Table 4> 
6 Discussion 
 
The importance of salient rewards, long emphasized by Vernon Smith and formalized with his 
“Induced Value Theory” (Smith, 1976), is a defining feature of experimental economics. It 
separates experimental economics research from much related work on decision making 
occurring in other social science and business school environments.  Unfortunately, this 
emphasis might be thought to entail an inability to use laboratory investigations to study 
behavior and decision in very high stakes environments. Here we have argued that, in fact, this is 
not correct. In particular, we have demonstrated that using the “preference inducement” 
procedure (Berg et al, 1986) one is able to generate high-stakes behavior within a low-stakes 
laboratory environment. 
We focused on the behavior discovered by Holt and Laury (2002). They found that risk 
attitudes varied systematically with the magnitude of the payoff associated with the decision. 
Moreover, they estimated a utility function that captured the dependence of choice on size of 
payoff. In this paper we showed that, in a low-stakes environment, the Berg et al (1986) 
procedure can be used to generate choices in this risk task that follow the same patterns Holt and 
Laury found in their high-stakes conditions.  
Economically important decisions under risk often occur in high-stakes environments, 
lending special importance to our study.  Also, these risk-decisions such as portfolio choices are 
lacking strategic elements, which we found attractive for this first-step investigation. In future 
research, we intend to induce preferences within game and market environments. This can be 
accomplished within any environment where appropriate data exists to back-out participant 
preferences (e.g., trader risk-aversion can be inferred from financial market data.) We are 
confident that doing this will enable preference inducement to become an increasingly valuable 
procedure for informing high-stakes behavior under novel institutions, and therefore become a 
key tool for anyone interested in mechanism design.  
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Chance of 
Receiving    
2 Dollars
Chance of 
Receiving 
1.6 Dollars
Chance of 
Receiving 
3.85 Dollars
Chance of 
Receiving 
0.1 Dollars
Decision 1 10% 90% 10% 90%
Decision 2 20% 80% 20% 80%
Decision 3 30% 70% 30% 70%
Decision 4 40% 60% 40% 60%
Decision 5 50% 50% 50% 50%
Decision 6 60% 40% 60% 40%
Decision 7 70% 30% 70% 30%
Decision 8 80% 20% 80% 20%
Decision 9 90% 10% 90% 10%
Decision 10 100% 0% 100% 0%
Treatment
Low $2.00 $1.60 $3.85 $0.10
x20 $40.00 $32.00 $77.00 $2.00
x50 $100.00 $80.00 $192.50 $5.00
x90 $180.00 $144.00 $346.50 $9.00
Hypothetical x20* $40.00 $32.00 $77.00 $2.00
Hypothetical x50* $100.00 $80.00 $192.50 $5.00
Hypothetical x90* $180.00 $144.00 $346.50 $9.00
Gamble A Gamble B
Gamble A
(Safe)
Gamble B
*In the hypothetical treatments dollar amounts listed are hypothetical 
amounts only. 
B. Holt - Laury Treatments
(Risky)
A. Holt - Laury Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions: Low Payout Treatment
Table 1
 
Chance of 
Receiving  
2 Points
Chance of 
Receiving 
1.6 Points
Chance of 
Receiving 
3.85 Points
Chance of 
Receiving 
0.1 Points
Decision 1 10% 90% 10% 90%
Decision 2 20% 80% 20% 80%
Decision 3 30% 70% 30% 70%
Decision 4 40% 60% 40% 60%
Decision 5 50% 50% 50% 50%
Decision 6 60% 40% 60% 40%
Decision 7 70% 30% 70% 30%
Decision 8 80% 20% 80% 20%
Decision 9 90% 10% 90% 10%
Decision 10 100% 0% 100% 0%
Option A Option B
Table 2
DHATJ Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions:                   
Low Payouts
 Treatment Choice
Dollars in HL/ 
Points in 
DHATJ
Chance of  
$2.50 Prize 
in DHATJ 
Treatment Choice
Dollars in HL/ 
Points in 
DHATJ
Chance of  
$2.50 Prize 
in DHATJ 
2 61% 180 79%
1.6 52% 144 71%
3.85 97% 346.5 99%
0.1 7% 9 1%
40 65% 360 89%
32 56% 288 83%
77 97% 693 100%
2 2% 18 1%
100 73%
80 64%
192.5 99%
5 1%
Holt-Laury and DHATJ Treatment Comparrison
50
90
180
A
B
BB
B
A
A
Low
20
B
A
Table 3
Note that in HL (DHATJ) chance of receiving the high number of Dollars (Points) for choice A or B increases by 
round starting with 10%, in round 1, and increasing to 100%, in round 10.
A
 
 
HL DHATJ HL DHATJ
Low $2.41 $1.67 $24.87 $17.06
x20 $47.18 $1.71 $486.18 $17.44
x50 $113.73 $1.85 $1,168.98 $18.75
x90 $204.71 $1.97 $2,104.16 $19.85
x180 $388.17 $2.19 $3,974.67 $21.99
Cost Comparrison
Table 4
Expected costs calculated by power-expo utility maximizing 
behavior by all agents
Expected Cost per 
Observation If Paying    
For All 10 Choices
Expected Cost per 
Observation If Paying    
For 1 of 10 Choices
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